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Abstract
Higher order differentiation was introduced in a cryptographic context by Lai. Several attacks can
be viewed in the context of higher order differentiations, amongst them the cube attack and the AIDA
attack. All of the above have been developed for the binary case.
We examine differentiation in larger fields, starting with the field GF(p) of integers modulo a prime
p. We prove a number of results on differentiating polynomials over such fields and then apply these
techniques to generalising the cube attack to GF(p). The crucial difference is that now the degree in
each variable can be higher than one, and our proposed attack will differentiate several times with
respect to each variable (unlike the classical cube attack and its larger field version described by Dinur
and Shamir, both of which differentiate at most once with respect to each variable).
Finally we describe differentiation over finite fields GF(pm) with pm elements and prove that it
can be reduced to differentiation over GF(p), so a cube attack over GF(pm) would be equivalent to
cube attacks over GF(p).
Keywords: Higher order differentiation, cube attack, higher order derivative.
1 Introduction
The original motivation for this work was to generalise the cube attack from the binary field to arbitrary
finite fields. While doing so, we developed a number of tools and results for differentiation over finite fields
which could have a broader applicability in cryptography.
Higher order differentiation was introduced in a cryptographic context by Lai in [14] (called there
higher order derivative). This notion had already been used for a very long time, under the name of finite
difference, in other areas of mathematics (notably for the numerical approximation of the derivative).
The finite difference for a function f is defined as the function (∆af)(x) = f(x + a) − f(x), for a
fixed difference a (the domain and codomain of f are commutative groups in additive notation). Usually
f is a function of n variables, so x = (x1, . . . , xn) and a = (a1, . . . , an). An important particular case is
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the finite difference with respect to one variable, namely a = hei where the difference step h is a scalar
constant (equal to 1 by default) and ei are the elementary vectors having a 1 in position i and zeroes
elsewhere. Higher order differentiation means repeated application of the finite difference operator.
The functions we use here are functions in several variables over a finite field. Any such function can
be represented as a polynomial function and after a sufficiently high number of applications of the finite
difference operator the result is the identically zero function. However for certain choices of differences
a, this can happen prematurely, for example over the binary field GF(2) differentiating twice using the
same difference a will always result in the zero function, regardless of the original function f . For our
applications, we need to ensure that this does not happen prematurely.
A number of cryptographic attacks can be reformulated using higher order differentiation. Differential
cryptanalysis (introduced by Biham and Shamir [3]) has been thus reformulated by Lai in [14]; the cube
attack of Dinur and Shamir [5] and the related AIDA attack of Vielhaber [17] have been reformulated in
Knellwolf and Meier [11], Duan and Lai [7].
Our main motivation came from the cube attack. In both the cube attack and the AIDA attack we
have a “black box” function f in several public and secret variables and we select a set of indices of public
variables I = {i1, . . . , ik}. Then f is evaluated at each point of a “cube” consisting of the vectors that
have all the possible combinations of 0/1 values for the variables with index in I, whereas the remaining
variables are left indeterminate; the resulting values are summed and the sum will be denoted fI . The
attacks hope that for suitable choices of subsets I of public variables, the resulting fI is linear in the secret
variables, for the cube attack (or equals to one secret variable or the product of several secret variables for
the AIDA attack). This situation is particularly likely when the cardinality of I is just marginally lower
than the total degree of the function. Such subsets I are found in a preprocessing phase, where the values
of the keys can be chosen freely. In the online phase the key variables are unknown, and by computing
the fI for the sets I identified in the preprocessing phase, one obtains a system of linear equations in the
key variables.
It was shown (see Knellwolf and Meier [11], Duan and Lai [7]) that choosing the variable indices
I = {i1, . . . , ik} and computing fI (as described above) is equivalent to computing the k-order finite
difference of f with respect to the elementary vectors ei1 , . . . , eik , i.e. by differentiating once with respect
to xi1 , then w.r.t. xi2 and so on, finally differentiating w.r.t. xik .
All the attacks above, as well as the higher order differentiation used in cryptography are over the
binary field. While all cryptographic functions can be viewed as binary functions, there are a number of
ciphers which make significant use of operations modulo a prime p > 2 in their internal processing, for
example ZUC [9], IDEA [15, 16], MMB [4]. It may therefore be advantageous for such ciphers to also be
viewed and analysed as functions over GF(p), the field of integers modulo p. Unlike the binary case, a
polynomial function can now have degree more than one in each variable, in fact it can have degree up
to p− 1 in each variable. There are yet other ciphers which use operations over Galois fields of the form
GF(pm), for example SNOW [8] and in such fields the degree of the polynomial functions can be up to
pm − 1 in each variable.
A first generalisation of the cube attack to GF(pm) was sketched by Dinur and Shamir in [5, page 284]
and also developed more explicitly by Agnese and Pedicini [1]. We show that their approach can again
be viewed as k-order differentiation, where we differentiate once with respect to each of the variables
xi1 , . . . , xik . However we argue that their generalisation, while correct, has very low chances to lead to
a successful attack because we don’t differentiate sufficiently many times. Namely, on one hand, like in
the binary case, the best chances of success are when the function is differentiated a number of times just
marginally lower than its total degree; on the other hand in their proposed scheme the number of times
that the function is differentiated is upper bounded by the number of variables, which (unlike the binary
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case) can be significantly lower then the degree of the function (see Remark 12).
Our proposed generalisation of the cube attack to GF(p) improves the chances of success by differ-
entiating several times with respect to each of the chosen variables. Thus there is no intrinsic limit on
the number of differentiations and therefore this number can be as close as we want to the degree of the
polynomial (only limited by the computing power available).
We first examine higher order differentiation in GF(p) (Section 4.1). We show that for repeated
differentiation with respect to the same variable, we can use any non-zero difference steps and the degree
will decrease by exactly one for each differentiation. Choosing all the steps equal to one gives a compact
and efficient formula for evaluating the higher order differentiation for a “black box” function.
We then show, in Section 4.2 that the main result of the classical cube attack, [5, Theorem 1], no
longer holds when we differentiate repeatedly with respect to the same variable in GF(p); Example 20
gives a counterexample. However, we show that a similar result does hold, see Theorem 21. Also, just like
in the binary case, if the “black box” function has total degree d, differentiating d− 1 times with respect
to public variables always results in a function which is either constant or is linear in the secret variables.
The resulting algorithm is sketched in Section 4.3. Now we not only choose variables for the “cube”
but we also choose the number of times we are going to differentiate with respect to each variable. For
computational efficiency, choosing only one variable (or a small number of variables) and differentiating a
large number of times with respect to that variable is preferable. In GF(p) probabilistic linearity testing
has a smaller expected number of tests than in GF(2), see [10].
While this paper concentrates on generalising the cube attack, other attacks that use differentiation
could also be generalised to GF(p) using our technique, for example cube testers (see [2]) or differential
cryptanalysis.
Finally, for completeness, we deal with generalisations to finite fields of the form GF(pm) in Section 5.2.
Here, for functions such as xd with p | d, differentiation with respect to x decreases the degree by more
than one regardless of the difference step. We give a more precise expression of the decrease in degree
for higher order differentiation depending on the representation of the degree in base p. Any function can
be differentiated at most m(p − 1) times before it becomes identically zero. Moreover, in order to avoid
the result becoming identically zero even earlier, the difference steps will be chosen as follows: p− 1 steps
equal to b0, p− 1 steps equal to b1 and so on, where b0, . . . , bm−1 is a base of GF(p
m) when viewed as a
vector space over GF(p). We can thus differentiate m(p − 1) times. Due to the fact that differentiation
only uses the additive group of GF(pm), which is isomorphic to GF(p)m, differentiation over GF(pm) can
in fact be reduced to differentiation over GF(p) in each component of the projection of the function f .
Therefore, we feel that developing a cube attack in GF(pm), while possible, does not bring any additional
advantages compared to a cube attack in GF(p).
2 Preliminaries
Throughout this paper R denotes an arbitrary commutative ring with identity and GF(pm) denotes the
finite field with pm elements where p is prime. We denote by ei = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Rn the vector
which has a 1 in position i and zeroes elsewhere, i.e. e1, . . . , en is the canonical basis of the vector space
Rn.
We recall the definition of differentiation, which was introduced in the cryptographic context by Lai
in [14]. This notion was used long before, under the name finite difference, in other areas of mathematics,
notably for approximating the derivative.
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Definition 1. Let f : Rn → Rs be a function in n variables x1, . . . , xn. Let a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ Rn \ {0}.
The finite difference operator (or differentiation operator) with respect to a associates to each function f
the function ∆af : R
n → Rs defined as
∆af(x1, . . . , xn) = f(x1 + a1, . . . , xn + an)− f(x1, . . . , xn).
Denoting x = (x1, . . . , xn) we can also write ∆af(x) = f(x+ a)− f(x).
For the particular case of a = hei for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n and h ∈ R \ {0}, we will call ∆hei the finite
difference operator (or differentiation) with respect to the variable xi with step h, or simply the finite
difference operator with respect to the variable xi if h = 1 or if h is clear from the context. We will use
the abbreviation “w.r.t. xi” for “with respect to xi”.
Remark 2. Note that in the cryptographic literature this operator (and the resulting function) is usually
called the derivative or differential (see [14, 12]). We will avoid the term derivative because of the risk
of confusion with the well established mathematical notion of formal derivative of a polynomial. For a
polynomial
∑d
i=0 cix
i ∈ R[x] the formal derivative w.r.t. x is defined as
∑d
i=1 ciix
i−1. It can easily be
seen that the formal derivative operator w.r.t. xi coincides with the finite difference operator w.r.t. xi
only for polynomials which have degree at most one in xi. Polynomial functions over GF(2) have degree at
most one in each variable, so in this case these notions coincide. Hence the use of the term “derivative” for
∆heif(x1, . . . , xn) is justified for polynomials over GF(2), but not for polynomials over other rings/fields.
Remark 3. For defining the finite difference operator, we do not actually need to work over a ring R, a
commutative group (using additive notation for convenience) is sufficient. Here we used a ring due to our
application to finite fields, and also due to some of the techniques involving polynomials.
The finite difference operator is a linear operator; it is commutative and associative. Repeated appli-
cation of the operator (also called higher order differentiation or higher order derivative in [14]) will be
denoted by
∆(k)a1,...,akf = ∆a1∆a2 . . .∆akf
where a1, . . . , ak ∈ Rn are not necessarily distinct. An explicit formula can be obtained easily from
Definition 1 by induction:
Proposition 4. Let f : Rn → Rs be a function in n variables x1, . . . , xn. Let a1, . . . , ak ∈ Rn \ {0} not
necessarily distinct. Then
∆(k)
a1,...,ak
f(x) =
k∑
j=0
(−1)k−j
∑
{i1,...,ij}⊆{1,...,k}
f(x+ ai1 + · · ·+ aij).
Depending of the values of the a1, . . . , ak and the characteristic of the ring, ∆
(k)
a1,...,akf could collapse,
becoming the identical zero function regardless of the function f . (This happens, for example, if the ring
is GF(2) and a1, . . . , ak are not linearly independent.) When differentiating w.r.t. one variable we need
to choose the difference steps so that that this does not happen. Details will be given in Section 4.1 for
finite fields of the form GF(p) and in Section 5.2 for finite fields of the form GF(pm).
While the finite difference operator can be defined for any function, in the sequel we will concentrate
on polynomial functions. We will denote by degxi(f) the degree of f in the variable xi. The total degree
will be denoted deg(f). The following three results are well known and straightforward, but will be needed
later. The first result states that differentiating with respect to one variable decreases the degree in that
variable by at least one. The other propositions deal with the results of the differentiation in a few simple
cases.
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Proposition 5. Let f : Rn → R be a polynomial function. Let h, h1, . . . , hk ∈ R \ {0} and i ∈
{1, . . . , n}. If degxi(f) = 0 then ∆heif(x1, . . . , xn) ≡ 0. If degxi(f) > 0 then degxi(∆heif) ≤ degxi(f)−1.
Consequently degxi(∆
(k)
h1ei,...,hkei
f) ≤ degxi(f)− k if k ≤ degxi(f), and ∆
(k)
h1ei,...,hkei
f is identically zero if
k > degxi(f).
Proposition 6. Let h ∈ R, h 6= 0 and i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Let f : Rn → R be a polynomial function with
degxi(f) = 1 i.e. f(x1, . . . , xn) = xig1(x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn) + g2(x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn) (g1 and
g2 are polynomial functions that do not depend on xi). Then
∆heif(x1, . . . , xn) = hg1(x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn).
Proposition 7. Let f : Rn → R be a polynomial function. Let h ∈ R, h 6= 0 and i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Factor-
ing out xi we write f(x1, . . . , xn) = xig1(x1, . . . , xn) + g2(x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn) (g2 is a polynomial
function that does not depend on xi, but g1 may depend on xi). Then
(∆heif)(x1, . . . , xi−1, 0, xi+1, . . . , xn) = hg1(x1, . . . , xi−1, h, xi+1, . . . , xn).
Recall that for integers d, k1, k2, . . . , ks such that
∑s
i=1 ki = d and ki ≥ 0 the multinomial is defined
as: (
d
k1, k2, . . . , ks
)
=
d!
k1!k2! · · · ks!
.
One combinatorial interpretation is the number of ways that we can distribute n objects into s (labeled)
boxes, so that the first box has k1 elements, the second k2 elements e.t.c. Multinomials are generalisations
of the usual binomial coefficients, with
(
d
k
)
=
(
d
k, d− k
)
.
Next we examine the effect of higher order differentiation on univariate monomials; the general formula
for univariate polynomials can be obtained using the linearity of the ∆ operator.
Theorem 8. Let f : R→ R defined by f(x) = xd. Let h1, . . . , hk ∈ R \ {0}
∆
(k)
h1e1,...,hke1
xd =
d∑
j=k


∑
(i1,...,ik)∈{1,2,...,j−k+1}
k
i1+...+ik=j
(
d
i1, . . . , ik, d− j
)
hi11 · · ·h
ik
k

xd−j
Proof. Induction on k. For k = 1 we have ∆h1e1x
d = (x+h1)
d−xd =
∑d
j=1
(
d
j
)
hj1x
d−j =
∑d
j=1
(
d
j,d−j
)
hj1x
d−j
and the statement is verified.
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Not let us assume the statement holds for a given k and we prove it for k + 1.
∆
(k+1)
h1e1,...,hk+1e1
xd = ∆hk+1e1∆
(k)
h1e1,...,hke1
xd
=
d∑
j=k


∑
(i1,...,ik)∈{1,2,...,j−k+1}
k
i1+...+ik=j
(
d
i1, . . . , ik, d− j
)
hi11 · · ·h
ik
k

 ((x+ hk+1)d−j − xd−j)
=
d∑
j=k


∑
(i1,...,ik)∈{1,2,...,j−k+1}
k
i1+...+ik=j
(
d
i1, . . . , ik, d− j
)
hi11 · · ·h
ik
k



 d−j∑
ik+1=1
(
d− j
ik+1
)
h
ik+1
k+1x
d−j−ik+1


=
d∑
j′=k+1


∑
(i1,...,ik+1)∈{1,2,...,j
′−k}k+1
i1+...+ik+1=j
′
(
d
i1, . . . , ik+1, d− j′
)
hi11 · · ·h
ik+1
k+1

xd−j
′
.
The last line uses the identity:
(
d
i1, . . . , ik, d− j
)(
d− j
ik+1
)
=
(
d
i1, . . . , ik+1, d− j′
)
where j = i1 + . . .+ ik and j
′ = j + ik+1.
Recall that in a finite field GF(pm) we have ap
m
= a for all elements a. Hence, while (formal)
polynomials over GF(pm) could have any degree in each variable, when we talk about the associated
polynomial function, there will always be a unique polynomial of degree at most pm − 1 in each vari-
able which defines the same polynomial function. In other words we are working in the quotient ring
GF(pm)[x1, . . . , xn]/〈x
pm
1 − x1, . . . x
pm
n − xn〉, and we use as representative of each class the unique poly-
nomial which has degree at most pm − 1 in each variable.
Moreover, all functions in n variables over a finite field can be written as polynomial functions of n
variables The polynomial can be obtained by interpolation from the values of the function at each point
in its (finite) domain. (This is obviously not the case for infinite fields). To summarise, each function in
n variables over GF(pm) can be uniquely expressed as a polynomial function defined by a polynomial in
GF(pm)[x1, . . . , xn] of degree at most p
m − 1 in each variable.
3 Classical cube attack and differentiation
In this section we first recall the classical cube attack from [5], and its interpretation in the framework of
higher order differentials (see [11, 7]). We then recall a first generalisation to higher fields sketched in [5]
(see also [1]).
In the cube attack ([5]), one has a “black box” polynomial function f : GF(2)n → GF(2) in n variables
x1, . . . , xn. Recall that polynomial functions over GF(2) have degree at most one in each variable. (Note
that the function is named p in the cube attack papers, but we had to rename it f as later we will work in
fields of characteristic other than 2, and we felt p was a well-established notation for the characteristic.)
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The next definitions are taken from [5]: “Any subset I of size k defines a k dimensional Boolean cube
CI of 2
k vectors in which we assign all the possible combinations of 0/1 values to variables in I and leave
all the other variables undetermined. Any vector v ∈ CI defines a new derived polynomial f|v with n− k
variables (whose degree may be the same or lower than the degree of the original polynomial). Summing
these derived polynomials over all the 2k possible vectors in CI we end up with a new polynomial which
is denoted by fI =
∑
v∈CI
f|v..” Note that the computation of fI requires 2
k calls to the “black box”
function f . On the other hand denoting by tI the product of the variables with indices in I = {i1, . . . , ik},
i.e. tI = xi1 · · ·xik , we can factor the common subterm tI out of some of the terms in f and write f as
f(x1, . . . , xn) = tIfS(I) + r(x1, . . . , xn).
where each of the terms of r(x1, . . . , xn) misses at least one of the variables with index in I. Note that
fS(I) is a polynomial in the variables with indices in {1, 2, . . . , n} \ I.
The cube attack is based on the following main result:
Theorem 9. ([5, Theorem 1]) For any polynomial f and subset of variables I, fI ≡ fS(I) (mod 2).
This result was reformulated using higher order differentials by several authors ([11, 7]). We present
such a reformulation using our notations:
Theorem 10. For any polynomial f and subset of variables I = {i1, . . . , ik}, we have ∆
(k)
ei1 ,...,eik
f = fI =
fS(I).
Proof. To show that fI = ∆
(k)
ei1 ,...,eik
f we use Proposition 4. We have
∆(k)ei1 ,...,eik
f(x) =
∑
(b1,...,bk)∈GF (2)k
f(x1, . . . , xi1−1, xi1 + b1, xi1+1, . . . , xik + bk, . . . , xn)
Note that evaluating the expression above for any fixed constant values of xi1 , . . . , xik yields fI . Hence
∆
(k)
ei1 ,...,eik
f does not depend on xi1 , . . . , xik and is equal to fI . By Theorem 9, fI = fS(I).
For the cube attack we are particularly interested in the situation when fS(I) (and therefore fI) has
degree exactly one, i.e. it is linear but not constant (the corresponding term tI is then called maxterm
in [5]). Let d be the total degree of f . Then I having d − 1 elements is a sufficient (but not necessary)
condition for fS(I) to have degree at most one, i.e. to be linear or constant.
Generalising the cube attack from the binary field to GF(pm) was sketched in [5]: “Over a general field
GF(pm) with p > 2, the correct way to apply cube attacks is to alternately add and subtract the outputs
of the master polynomial with public inputs that range only over the two values 0 and 1 (and not over all
their possible values of 0, 1, . . . , p), where the sign is determined by the sum (modulo 2) of the vector of
assigned values.”
We make this idea more precise; this was also done in [1] but we will follow a simpler approach for
the proof of the main result. Let f be again a function of n variables x1, . . . , xn, but this time over an
arbitrary finite field GF(pm). Note that now f can have degree up to pm − 1 in each variable.
As before, we select a subset of k indices I = {i1, . . . , ik} ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n} and consider a “cube” CI
consisting of the n-tuples which have all combinations of the values 0/1 for the variables with indices in
I, while the other variables remain indeterminate. The function f is evaluated at the points in the cube
and these values are summed with alternating + and − signs obtaining a value
fI =
∑
v∈CI
(−1)k−w(v)f|v
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where w(v) denotes the Hamming weight of v ignoring the variables what have remained indeterminate.
On the other hand denoting by tI the product of the variables with indices in I, we can factor the
common subterm tI out of some of the terms in f and write f as
f(x1, . . . , xn) = tIfS(I)(x1, . . . , xn) + r(x1, . . . , xn).
where each of the terms of r(x1, . . . , xn) misses at least one of the variables with index in I. Note that,
unlike the binary case, now fS(I) can contain variables with indices in I.
Now we can prove an analogue of Theorems 9 and 10. (A similar theorem appears in [1, Theorem 6],
but both the statement and the proof are more complicated, involving a term t = xr1i1 · · ·x
rk
ik
instead of
xi1 · · ·xik and consequently when factoring out t and writing f = tfS(t) + q, having to treat separately
the terms of q which contain some variables with indices in I, and the terms of q which do not.)
Theorem 11. Let f : GF(pm)n → GF(pm) be a polynomial function and I a subset of variable indices.
Denote by v the n-tuple having values of 1 in the positions with indices in I and indeterminates in the
other positions, and by u the n-tuple having values of 0 in the positions in I and indeterminates in the
other positions. Then:
fI = (∆
(k)
ei1 ,...,eik
f)(u) = fS(I)(v)
Proof. The fact that fI = (∆
(k)
ei1 ,...,eik
f)(u) follows from Proposition 4 in the same way as in the proof of
Theorem 10.
It suffices to show (∆
(k)
ei1 ,...,eik
f)(u) = fS(I)(v) for the case when f is a monomial. The rest follows
from the linearity of the operators, as (f + g)S(I) = fS(I) + gS(I) and ∆ is a linear operator.
If f is a monomial not divisible by tI , then both fS(I) and ∆
(k)
ei1 ,...,eik
f are identically zero, the latter
using Proposition 5.
Now assume f = tIfS(I) for some monomial fS(I). Like in the proof of [5, Theorem 1], we note that in
the sum in the definition of fI (or, equivalently in the sum given by Proposition 4 for (∆
(k)
ei1 ,...,eik
f)(u))
only one term is non-zero; namely tI evaluates to a non-zero value iff xi1 = . . . = xik = 1; hence
fI = fS(I)(v).
Remark 12. A cube attack based on Theorem 11 above would again search for sets I for which fI is
linear in the variables whose indices are not in I. If the total degree of f is d, the total degree of fI can
be, in the worst case, d− k. If k = d− 1 we can guarantee that fI is linear or a constant. More generally,
the closer k gets to d− 1 (while still having k ≤ d− 1), the higher the chances of linearity.
However, unlike the binary case where d ≤ n, now d can have any value up to (pm − 1)n. Hence the
(unknown) degree d of f could well be considerably higher than the number of variables n. In such a case,
k ≤ n−1 is considerably lower than d−1, and the chances of linearity are very small. In other words, since
we differentiate at most once w.r.t. each variable, so a total of at most n− 1 times, the degree decreases
by around n− 1 in general, and the resulting function can still have quite a high degree. Therefore, while
a cube attack based on this result would be correct, it would have extremely low chances of success.
Our proposed generalisation of this attack would increase these chances by differentiating several
times with respect to each variable. This will result in a greater decrease of the degree, thus improving
the chances of reaching a linear result.
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4 Generalisations to GF(p)
4.1 Differentiation in GF(p)
Differentiation with respect to a variable decreases the degree in that variable by at least one. In the binary
case, the degree of a polynomial function in each variable is at most one, so we can only differentiate once
w.r.t. each variable; a second differentiation will trivially produce the zero function. In GF(p) the degree
in each variable is up to p− 1. We can therefore consider differentiating several times (and possibly using
different difference steps) with respect to each variable. We first show that a monomial of degree di in a
variable xi can be differentiated mi times w.r.t. xi, for any mi ≤ di (and using any collection of non-zero
difference steps) and the degree decreases by exactly mi. Hence we can differentiate di times without the
result becoming identically zero.
Theorem 13. Let m1 ≤ d1 ≤ p− 1 and h1, . . . , hm1 ∈ GF(p) \ {0}. Then
∆
(m1)
h1e1,...,hm1e1
xd11 =
=
d1∑
j=m1


∑
(i1,...,im1 )∈{1,2,...,j−m1+1}
m1
i1+...+im1=j
(
d1
i1, . . . , im1 , d1 − j
)
hi11 · · ·h
im1
m1

 xd1−j1
In the expression above the coefficient of xd1−m11 equals(
d1
1, 1, . . . , 1, d1 −m1
)
h1 · · ·hm1 =
d1!
(d1 −m1)!
h1 · · ·hm1 6= 0
hence the degree in x1 is exactly d1 − m1. For the particular case of h1 = . . . = hm1 = 1, the leading
coefficient becomes (
d1
1, 1, . . . , 1, d1 −m1
)
=
d1!
(d1 −m1)!
and the free term becomes
∑
(i1,...,im1 )∈{1,2,...,d1−m1+1}
m1
i1+...+im1=d1
(
d1
i1, . . . , im1 , 0
)
. (1)
If h1 = . . . = hm1 = 1 and moreover d1 = m1 we have
∆(d1)
e1,...,e1
xd11 =
(
d1
1, 1, . . . , 1, 0
)
mod p = d1! mod p. (2)
Proof. Use Theorem 8. Since d1 < p, we have that
d1!
(d1 −m1)!
is not divisible by p.
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Example 14. Let f(x1, x2, x3, x4) = x
5
1x2 + x
4
1x3x4 + x
6
4 be a polynomial with coefficients in GF(31).
We choose the variable x1 and differentiate repeatedly w.r.t. x1, always with difference step equal to one.
Differentiating once w.r.t. x1 we obtain:
∆e1f(x1, x2, x3, x4) =
x41(5x2) + x
3
1(10x2 + 4x3x4) + x
2
1(10x2 + 6x3x4) + x1(5x2 + 4x3x4) + x2 + x3x4
Differentiating again w.r.t. x1 we obtain:
∆(2)
e1,e1
f(x1, x2, x3, x4) =
x31(20x2) + x
2
1(29x2 + 12x3x4) + x1(8x2 + 24x3x4) + 30x2 + 14x3x4
Finally, if we differentiate a total of 5 times we obtain:
∆(5)e1,...,e1f(x1, x2, x3, x4) = 5!x2 = 27x2
as expected by (2).
For the remainder of this section, for simplicity we will always choose all the difference steps hi equal
to one. The case of arbitrary hi can be treated similarly, but the formulae become more cumbersome. For
convenience we will introduce some more notation. We pick a subset of k variable indices I = {i1, . . . , ik}
and we also pick multiplicities for each variable, m1, . . . ,mk. Denote by t the term t = x
m1
i1
· · ·xmkik . We
will apply the finite difference operator m1 times w.r.t. the variable xi1 , and m2 times w.r.t. the variable
xi2 etc. always with difference step equal to one. More precisely we define:
ft(x1, . . . , xn) = ∆
(m1)
ei1
,...,ei1
. . .∆(mk)eik ,...,eik
f(x1, . . . , xn)
We now generalise Theorem 13 to the case when we differentiate w.r.t. several variables.
Theorem 15. Let k ≤ n and let m1, . . . ,mk and d1, . . . , dk be integers such that 1 ≤ mℓ ≤ dℓ ≤ p− 1 for
ℓ = 1, . . . , k. Let {i1, . . . , ik} ⊆ {1, . . . , n} and let f : GF(p)n → GF(p), f(x1, . . . , xn) = x
d1
i1
· · ·xdkik and
t = xm1i1 · · ·x
mk
ik
. We have
ft =
d1∑
j1=m1
. . .
dk∑
jk=mk
D(d1, j1,m1) . . . D(dk, jk,mk)x
d1−j1
i1
. . . xdk−jkik
where for any 1 ≤ m ≤ j ≤ d we define
D(d, j,m) =
∑
(i1,...,im)∈{1,2,...,j−m+1}
m
i1+...+im=j
(
d
i1, . . . , im, d− j
)
.
The coefficient of xd1−m1i1 . . . x
dk−mk
ik
in ft is equal to
∏k
ℓ=1
dℓ!
(dℓ −mℓ)!
6= 0 and the free term is equal to
∏k
ℓ=1D(dℓ, dℓ,mℓ). The total degree of ft is
∑k
ℓ=1(dℓ −mℓ).
For the particular case of m1 = d1, . . . ,mk = dk, we have
ft = d1! . . . dk!.
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Proof. Induction on k, applying Theorem 13.
When all the difference steps hi are equal to one, the evaluation of the finite difference for a “black
box” function f using Proposition 4 becomes simpler. We treat first the case when we differentiate w.r.t.
a single variable:
Proposition 16. Let f : Rn → R. Then
fxm11 (x1, . . . , xn) =
∆(m1)
e1,...,e1
f(x1, . . . , xn) =
m1∑
i=0
(−1)m1−i
(
m1
i
)
f(x1 + i, x2, . . . , xn). (3)
If R has characteristic p and m1 < p then all the coefficients
(
m1
i
)
in the sum above are non-zero. If f
is a “black box” function, evaluating fxm11 at one point in its domain requires m1 + 1 evaluations of f .
Proof. The formula follows from Proposition 4. Since 0 ≤ i ≤ m1 < p and p is prime,
(
m1
i
)
cannot be
divisible by p, so it is non-zero in a field of characteristic p.
We now look at the situation where we differentiate w.r.t. several variables xi1 , . . . , xik .
Proposition 17. Let f : Rn → R and t =
∏k
ℓ=1 x
mℓ
iℓ
. Then
ft(x) =
m1∑
j1=0
. . .
mk∑
jk=0
(−1)
∑
k
ℓ=1(mℓ−jℓ)
(
m1
j1
)
· · ·
(
mk
jk
)
f(. . . , xi1 + j1, . . . , xik + jk, . . .).
If R has characteristic p and all mℓ < p, then all the coefficients
(
m1
j1
)
· · ·
(
mk
jk
)
in the sum above are
non-zero. If f is a “black box” function, one evaluation of ft needs
∏k
ℓ=1(mℓ + 1) evaluations of f . In
particular evaluating ft for xiℓ = 0, ℓ = 1, . . . , k we obtain:
m1∑
j1=0
. . .
mk∑
jk=0
(−1)
∑
k
ℓ=1(mℓ−jℓ)
(
m1
j1
)
· · ·
(
mk
jk
)
f(. . . , j1, . . . , jk, . . .) (4)
with j1, . . . , jk in positions i1, . . . , ik respectively.
We note that in terms of the time complexity of evaluating ft, it is now not only the total degree of
t that matters (as in the binary case), but also the exponents of each variable. For a given number m of
differentiations (i.e. t of total degree m), the smallest time complexity is achieved when t contains only
one variable, i.e. t = xmi1 . Among all t of total degree m that contain k variables, the best time complexity
is achieved when t has degree one in each but one of its variables, e.g. t = xm−k+1i1 xi2 . . . xik .
Remark 18. We saw that in the binary case, differentiating once w.r.t. each of the variables xi1 , . . . xik is
equivalent to summing f evaluated over a “cube” consisting of all the 0/1 combinations for the variables
xi1 , . . . xik . According to Proposition 17, the analogue of the “cube” will now be a k-dimensional grid/mesh
with sides of “length” m1,m2, . . . ,mk. Namely each variable xiℓ w.r.t. which we differentiate will have
increments of 0, 1, . . . ,mℓ and each term in the sum has alternating signs as well as being multiplied by
binomial coefficients.
11
4.2 Fundamental theorem of the cube attack generalised to GF(p)
We will use the notation ft = ∆
(m1)
ei1
,...,ei1
. . .∆
(mk)
eik
,...,eik
f with t = xm1i1 · · ·x
mk
ik
as in the previous section.
Factoring out t, we can write f as
f(x1, . . . , xn) = tfS(t)(x1, . . . , xn) + r(x1, . . . , xn)
where fS(t) and r are uniquely determined such as none of the terms in r is divisible by t.
We can already give a bound on the degree of ft:
Proposition 19. With the notations above, we have deg(ft) ≤ deg(fS(t)). In particular, if deg(t) =
deg(f)− 1 then ft is linear or constant.
Proof. When f is a monomial divisible by t, we have deg(ft) = deg(fS(t)) by Theorem 15. If f is a
monomial not divisible by t, then ft = 0. Finally, for a general f we use the linearity of the ∆ operator,
the fact that (f +g)S(t) = fS(t)+gS(t) and the fact that deg(f+g) ≤ deg(f)+deg(g), for any polynomials
f and g.
The result above is already sufficient for a cube attack. However, we will give a more refined result
shortly, in order to give an analogue of the main theorem of the classical cube attack (see Theorems 9,
10 and 11). At first sight we might expect Theorem 11 to hold here too, namely we might expect that
ft(x1, . . . , xn) evaluated at xij = 0 for j = 1, . . . , k equals fS(t)(x1, . . . , xn) evaluated at xij = 1 for
j = 1, . . . , k. However this is not true in general, as the following counterexample shows:
Example 20. We continue Example 14 for f(x1, x2, x3, x4) = x
5
1x2 + x
4
1x3x4 + x
6
4.
We computed fx1(x1, x2, x3, x4) in Example 14. Evaluating at x1 = 0 we obtain fx1(0, x2, x3, x4) =
x2 + x3x4. On the other hand fS(x1)(x1, x2, x3, x4) = x
4
1x2 + x
3
1x3x4. Evaluating at x1 = 1 we obtain
fS(x1)(1, x2, x3, x4) = x2+x3x4. Hence we verified that fx1(0, x2, x3, x4) = fS(x1)(1, x2, x3, x4) as expected
by Theorem 11.
Differentiating again w.r.t. x1 and evaluating fx21(x1, x2, x3, x4) at x1 = 0 gives fx21(0, x2, x3, x4) =
30x2+14x3x4. On the other hand fS(x21)(x1, x2, x3, x4) = x
3
1x2 + x
2
1x3x4, which evaluated at x1 = 1 gives
fS(x21)(1, x2, x3, x4) = x2 + x3x4
Hence fx21(0, x2, x3, x4) 6= fS(x21)(1, x2, x3, x4), so Theorem 11 cannot be extended in its current form to
the case when we differentiate more than once w.r.t. one variable. However, note that the two quantities
computed here do contain the same monomials.
Finally, if we differentiate 5 times with respect to x1 we obtain: fx51(x1, x2, x3, x4) = 27x2, whereas
fS(x51)(x1, x2, x3, x4) = x2 so again the two polynomials do not coincide; however they only differ by
multiplication by a constant.
The correct generalisation of the main theorem of the classical cube attack is the following:
Theorem 21. Let f : GF(p)n → GF(p) be a polynomial function and t =
∏k
j=1 x
mj
ij
. Denote
ft(x1, . . . , xn) = ∆
(m1)
ei1
,...,ei1
. . .∆(mk)
eik
,...,eik
f(x1, . . . , xn).
Write f as
f(x) = tfS(t)(x) + r(x)
so that none of the monomials in r are divisible by t.
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Denote by v the n-tuple having values of 1 in the positions i1, . . . , ik and indeterminates elsewhere,
and by u the n-tuple having values of 0 in the positions i1, . . . , ik and indeterminates elsewhere.
Write fS(t) = t1g1 + . . . + tugu, where gi are polynomials that do not depend on any of the variables
xi1 , . . . , xik and t1, . . . , tu are all the distinct terms in the variables xi1 , . . . , xik that appear in fS(t).
Then there are constants c1, . . . , cu ∈ GF(p) such that ft(u) equals c1g1+ . . .+ cugu (which can also be
viewed as c1t1g1 + . . . + cutugu evaluated at v). The exact values for the constants ci can be determined
as follows: if ti = x
ℓ1
i1
. . . xℓkik , then ci = D(m1 + ℓ1,m1 + ℓ1,m1) . . .D(mk + ℓk,mk + ℓk,mk) where D() is
as defined in Theorem 15.
In particular if fS(t) does not depend on any of the variables xi1 , . . . , xik then
ft(x) = m1! . . .mk!fS(t).
Proof. We first use Theorem 15 for individual monomials and then the linearity of the ∆ operator.
Again, for the cube attack we are interested in the cases where ft(u) is linear:
Corollary 22. With the notations of Theorem 21,
deg(ft(u)) ≤ deg(fS(t)(v)).
The latter is also equal to the total degree of fS(t)(x) in the variables {x1, . . . , xn} \ {xi1 , . . . , xik}. If
deg(fS(t)(v)) = 1 then ft(u) is linear or constant.
4.3 Proposed Algorithm for the cube attack in GF(p)
In this section we give more details of the algorithm, drawing on the results from previous sections. The
main idea of our proposed attack is that when the degree in one variable is higher than one, we can
differentiate w.r.t. that variable repeatedly, unlike the cube attacks described in the Section 3, which use
differentation at most once for each variable.
We are given a cryptographic “black box” function f(v1, . . . vm, x1, . . . , xn) with vi being public vari-
ables and xi being secret variables.
Preprocessing phase
1. Choose a term in the public variables, t = vm1i1 · · · v
mk
ik
, with 1 ≤ mi ≤ p− 1.
2. Using formula (4) in Proposition 17 we evaluate ft(0,x) for several choices of the secret variables x, in
order to decide whether, with reasonably high probability, the total degree of ft(0,x) in x equals one.
(For this one can use the textbook definition of linearity; namely, for various values of a, b ∈ GF(p)
and y, z ∈ GF(p)n test whether a(ft(0,y)−ft(0,0))+b(ft(0, z)−ft(0,0)) = ft(0, ay+bz)−ft(0,0);
in GF(p) with p large, we will need in general much fewer linearity tests than in the binary case,
see [10]; one can at the same time check whether ft(0,x) is non-constant).
3. If the decision above is ”yes”, we determine ft(0,x) explicitly, as ft(0,x) = c0 +
∑n
i=1 cixi where
c0 = ft(0,0) and ci = ft(0, ei)− c0; we store (t, c0, c1, . . . , cn).
4. Repeat the steps above for different values of t until one obtains n linearly independent stored tuples
(c1, . . . , cn), or until one runs out of time/memory.
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For the heuristic of choosing t one could take into account the computational cost for a term t, see
Proposition 17 and the comment following it. However a full heuristic is beyond the scope of this paper. A
number of optimisations have been proposed for the binary cube attack; many of them can be transferred
to the modulo p case, but again, this is beyond the scope of this paper.
Online phase
1. For each (t, c0, c1, . . . , cn) stored in the preprocessing phase, compute ft(0,x) (with x being now
unknown) using formula (4) in Proposition 17. Form the linear equation: c1x1 + . . . ,+cnxn + c0 =
ft(0,x).
2. Solve the system of linear equations thus obtained, determining the secret variables x1, . . . , xn. If
the preprocessing phase only produced s < n equations, then not all the secret variables can de
determined, we would need to do an exhaustive search for n− s of them.
Remark 23. Let ℓ be the length of the binary representation of p. We can view each bit of an element
in GF(p) as one binary variable. If f is a function of n variables over GF(p), we can also view it as
ℓ binary functions in ℓn binary variables. We could therefore apply the classical (binary) cube attack
on these functions. A rough estimate suggests that the running time for corresponding cubes will be
approximately the same. (Differentiating p − 1 times with respect to one variable xi in GF(p) takes p
evaluations of f ; differentiating once w.r.t. each of the binary variables that are components of xi will take
2ℓ evaluations of f ; we have p ≈ 2ℓ.) The chances of success on a particular cube bear no easy relationship
between the two approaches, because the degree of f and the degrees of the ℓ binary functions are not
related in a simple way.
Hence we would argue that in general one cannot tell which of the attacks will work better, so one
should try both. If the cipher has a structure that would suggest that the degree as polynomial over
GF(p) is relatively low, then a cube attack over GF(p) should certainly be an approach to consider.
5 Generalisations to GF(pm)
In this section we take our generalisation further, to arbitrary finite fields GF(pm). An important particular
case would be GF(2m), as many cryptographic algorithms include operations over a field of this type.
5.1 Preliminaries
We need some known results regarding the values of binomial coefficients and multinomial coefficients in
fields of finite characteristic.
Theorem 24. (Kummer’s Theorem, [13, p. 115]) Let n ≥ k ≥ 0 be integers and p a prime. Let j be
the highest exponent for which
(
n
k
)
is divisible by pj. Then j equals the sum of carries when adding k and
n− k as numbers written in base p.
Kummer’s theorem has been generalised to multinomials by various authors (see for example [6] and
citations therein).
Theorem 25. Let d, k1, k2, . . . , ks be integers such that
∑s
i=1 ki = d and ki ≥ 0 and let p be a prime. Let
j be the highest exponent for which
(
d
k1,k2,...,ks
)
is divisible by pj. Then j equals the sum of all the carries
when adding all of k1, k2, . . . , ks as numbers written in base p.
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We will be interested in the situations where the multinomial coefficients are not zero modulo p.
Corollary 26. Let p be a prime. The following are equivalent:
(i) The multinomial coefficient
(
d
k1,k2,...,ks
)
is not zero modulo p.
(ii) There are no carries when adding k1, k2, . . . , ks as numbers written in base p.
(iii) In base p, each digit of n equals to the sum of the digits of k1, k2, . . . , ks in the corresponding position.
5.2 Differentiation in GF(pm)
When moving from GF(p) to GF(pm) several things work differently. For a start, differentiating once
w.r.t. a variable x may decrease the degree in x by more than one, regardless of the difference step. For
example let us differentiate xd once. In (x+ h)d − xd the coefficient of xd−1 is dh, so when d is a multiple
of p the degree is strictly less than d − 1. To examine the general case we will use Theorem 8, so we
introduce for convenience the following notation:
Cp(d, j, k) = {(i1, . . . , ik)|1 ≤ ij ≤ d, i1 + . . .+ ik = j, and
(
d
i1, . . . , ik, n− j
)
6≡ 0 mod p}.
Note that Corollary 26 gives a useful characterisation of this set. We have:
Theorem 27. Let f : GF(pm) → GF(pm), f(x) = xd, d < pm. Let 0 < k ≤ m(p − 1) and let
h1, . . . , hk ∈ GF(p
m)\{0}. The degree of ∆
(k)
h1e1,...,hke1
xd is less than or equal to the integer d′ computed as
follows: write d in base p as d = dudu−1 . . . d1d0; let i be the highest integer for which d0+d1+ · · ·+di ≤ k;
define d′i+1 = di+1 − (k − (d0 + d1 + · · · + di)); finally define d
′ as the number written in base p as
d′ = dudu−1 . . . di+2d
′
i+10 . . . 0 (with i+ 1 zeroes at the end).
In particular, for p = 2, the binary representation of the degree d′ is obtained from the binary repre-
sentation of d by replacing k of its ones by zeroes, starting from the least significant digit.
Proof. By Theorem 8 the degree d′ will be less than or equal to d − j where j is minimal such that
Cp(d, j, k) 6= ∅. Using Corollary 26(iii) we see that the minimum value for j for given d and k is achieved
by choosing i1, . . . , ik ≥ 1 as small as possible while maintaining
(
d
i1,...ik,d−j
)
not equal to zero modulo p.
This is achieved by choosing i1, . . . ik as follows: d0 of them will be equal to 1, d1 will be equal to p (i.e.
10 in base p), d2 will be equal to p
2 (i.e. 100 in base p), . . ., di of them will be equal to p
i and finally
k− (d0 + d1 + · · ·+ di) will be equal to pi+1. It can be verified that d′ = d− (i1 + . . .+ ik) will then have
the form described in the theorem statement.
Note that the sum of the digits of a number in base p plays an important role here. For any non-
negative integer a we will introduce the notation Sp(a) as being the sum of the digits in the base p
representation of a. We define the digit-sum degree of a univariate polynomial f in a variable xi as being
max{Sp(j)|cj 6= 0} where f =
∑d
j=0 cjx
j
i with cj polynomials in the remaining variables. The previous
theorem implies:
Corollary 28. Let f be a polynomial function and let s be the digit-sum degree of f in xi. Then
differentiating f a total of s times w.r.t. xi will always produce a polynomial function which does not
depend on xi (possibly the identically zero function).
Corollary 29. Any function f : GF(pm) → GF(pm) can be differentiated at most m(p− 1) times w.r.t.
a given variable before the result becomes the identically zero function.
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Is the bound in Corollary 28 tight, in the sense that there are functions which are non-zero after a
number of differentiations equal to their digit-sum degree? In particular, are there functions which are
still non-zero after m(p−1) differentiations? We will show that this indeed the case, but only if we choose
the hi carefully. First let us illustrate a choice of the steps hi which we need to avoid. By Proposition 16,
if we differentiate p times with all steps equal to 1 the result is identically zero regardless of the original
function f :
∆(p)e1,...,e1f(x1, . . . , xn) =
p∑
i=0
(−1)p−i
(
p
i
)
f(x1 + i, x2, . . . , xn)
= f(x1 + p, x2, . . . , xn)− f(x1, x2, . . . , xn)
= 0.
because all the coefficients
(
p
i
)
for 0 < i < p are divisible by p.
Denote by b0, . . . , bm−1 a basis of GF(p
m) viewed as a m-dimensional vector space over GF(p). We
choose the sequence h1, . . . , h(p−1)m as follows: p− 1 values of b0, followed by p− 1 values of b1 etc.
As in Section 4, we pick a set of variables and their multiplicities, defining the term t = xm1i1 · · ·x
mk
ik
.
For a polynomial function f in n variables, we now define:
ft(x1, . . . , xn) = ∆
(m1)
h1ei1 ,...,hm1ei1
. . .∆
(mk)
h1eik ,...,hmkeik
f(x1, . . . , xn)
where the sequence h1, . . . , hm(p−1) has been fixed as above. We will concentrate on differentiating several
times w.r.t. one variable, x1.
For these choices of hi Proposition 4 becomes:
Proposition 30. Let f : GF(pm)n → GF(pm) be a polynomial function and let t = xm11 . Write m1 =
q(p− 1) + r with 0 < r ≤ p− 1 (note the slight difference from the usual quotient and reminder, as here
the reminder can be p− 1 but cannot be 0). Then
ft(x) =
∑
a0,...,aq
(−1)m1−
∑q
i=0 ai
(
p− 1
a0
)
· · ·
(
p− 1
aq−1
)(
r
aq
)
f(x1 + a0b0 + . . .+ aqbq, x2, . . . , xn)
where the sum is over all tuples (a0, . . . , aq) ∈ {0, . . . , p− 1}q × {0, . . . , r}.
All the coefficients in the sum above are non-zero. If f is a “black box” function, one evaluation of ft
needs pq(r + 1) evaluations of f .
Proof. Similar to the proof of Proposition 17.
We show next that our choice of hi is indeed a valid choice in the sense that there are functions which
can be differentiated m(p− 1) times w.r.t. the same variable without becoming zero.
Proposition 31. For each t = xm11 with 0 ≤ m1 ≤ m(p− 1) there is at least a function f : GF(p
m)n →
GF(pm) such that ft(x) is not the identical zero function. Moreover there is at least a polynomial function
f with digit-sum degree in x1 equal to m1 such that ft(x) is a non-zero constant function.
Proof. We will construct a polynomial function f in one variable, x1. Write m1 = q(p − 1) + r with
0 < r ≤ p − 1 as in Proposition 30. In the formula in Proposition 30 all the terms in the sum have
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a non-zero coefficient, and have distinct arguments for f . We will prescribe the values of f at these
evaluation points and then interpolate f . Namely we will prescribe f(a0b0 + . . . + aqbq) = 0 for all
(a0, . . . , aq) ∈ {0, . . . , p− 1}q × {0, . . . , r} except a0 = . . . = aq = 0, where f(0) 6= 0. The polynomial f is
interpolated as
f(x1) =
∏
(x1 − (a0b0 + . . .+ aqbq))
where the product is over (a0, . . . , aq) ∈ {0, . . . , p− 1}
q × {0, . . . , r} except a0 = . . . = aq = 0. It can be
easily seen that degx1(f) = (r + 1)p
q − 1, so the representation of its degree in base p consists of a digit
of r followed by q digits of p− 1. Hence Sp(degx1(f)) = q(p− 1) + r = m1.
On the other hand, we know from Theorem 27 that ft is a constant (possibly zero). However ft(0) =
f(0) 6= 0 by Proposition 30 and our choice of interpolation points. Hence ft is a non-zero constant.
Note that there are other possible valid choices of hi, but we aimed to keep things simple computa-
tionally by using this particular choice.
Example 32. Consider f(x1) = x
5
1 ∈ GF(9)[x1]. We define h1 = h2 = 1 and h3 = h4 = α, where α
is a primitive element of GF(9). We compute the third order differential ∆
(3)
e1,e1,αe1f(x1) using either
Proposition 4 or Theorem 8 and obtain:
∆(3)e1,e1,αe1f(x1) = 2α
3 + α = 2α(α + 1)(α+ 2) 6= 0.
Generalising the results of this section to differentiation w.r.t. several variables is not difficult but the
notation becomes cumbersome. Moreover, we will see in the next subsection that such a generalisation is
not very useful for a practical attack, so we leave it as an exercise to the reader.
5.3 Reducing differentiation over GF(pm) to differentiation over GF(p)
Fix a basis b0, . . . , bm−1 ∈ GF(pm) for GF(pm) viewed as an m-dimensional vector space over GF(p). Any
element a ∈ GF(pm) can be uniquely written as a = a0b0 + . . . + am−1bm−1 with ai ∈ GF(p). Denote
by ϕ : GF(pm) → GF(p)m the vector space isomorphism defined by ϕ(a) = (a0, . . . , am−1); this can be
naturally extended to ϕ : GF(pm)n → GF(p)mn ; denote by πj : GF(pm) → GF(p) the m the projection
homomorphisms defined as πj(a) = aj .
Let f : GF(pm)n → GF(pm) be a polynomial function in n variables x1, . . . , xn. By writing xi =
xi0b0+. . .+xi,m−1bm−1 the function f can be alternatively viewed as a function f : GF(p)
nm → f : GF(p)m
defined by f = ϕ−1 ◦ f ◦ ϕ:
GF(pm)n
f
−→ GF(pm)
ϕ ↓ ↓ ϕ
GF(p)mn
f
−→ GF(p)m
Alternatively we can view f asm polynomial (projection) functions f0, . . . , fm−1 : GF(p)
nm → GF(p),
defined by f i = ϕ
−1 ◦ f ◦ πi each in nm variables xij with i = 1, . . . , n and j = 0, . . . ,m− 1.
Proposition 33. With the notations above, the total degree of f j in the variables xi0, . . . , xi,m−1 is at
most the digit-sum degree of f in xi.
17
Proof. It suffices to prove the statement for f = xd1. We do it by induction on the number of digits in
the representation of d1 in base p. For one digit, i.e. d = 1, 2, . . . , p − 1 it is trivially satisfied. For the
induction step, write d = pd′ + d0, with 0 ≤ d0 < p. Let A = x10b0 + x11b1 + . . .+ x1,m−1bm−1. We have:
Apd
′+d0 = (Ad
′
)pAd0
In GF(p) we have xp = x, so computing the power p of any polynomial function over GF(p) does not
change the degree in each variable. Hence the degree in x10, . . . , x1,m−1 of A
d equals at most the degree
of Ad0 plus the degree of Ad
′
, so by the induction hypothesis, it is at most equal to d0 plus the sum of the
digits of d′; this equals the sum of the digits of d.
Note that in the proposition above di ≤ pm − 1, so the sum of the digits of di is at most (p − 1)m.
On the other hand, f j are polynomial functions over GF(p), so they have degree at most p − 1 in each
variable. Therefore their total degree in the variables xi0, . . . , xi,m−1 is at most (p − 1)m, so these facts
tie in.
In the next theorem, since we are differentiating functions in a different number of variables, we will
use for elementary vectors the notation e
(n)
i
instead of ei to clarify the length n of the elementary vector.
Note that here the difference steps are elements in a basis of GF(pm), but they do not need to be in the
order prescribed in the discussion at the beginning of Section 5.2.
Theorem 34. Let f : GF(pm)n → GF(pm) be a polynomial function and let r0, . . . , rm−1 with 0 ≤ ri ≤
p− 1.
∆
(r0)
b0e
(n)
1 ,...,b0e
(n)
1
. . .∆
(rm−1)
bm−1e
(n)
1 ,...,bm−1e
(n)
1
f = ∆
(r0)
e
(mn)
1 ,...,e
(mn)
1
. . .∆
(rm−1)
e
(mn)
m−1
,...,e
(mn)
m−1
f
the latter being a differentiation r0 times w.r.t x10, r1 times w.r.t x11, . . ., rm−1 times w.r.t. x1,m−1.
Proof. Induction on
∑p−1
i=0 ri. For the base case, we can assume without loss of generality that r0 = 1 and
ri = 0 for i ≥ 1. We have:
∆b0e1f(x1, . . . , xn)
= f(x1 + b0, . . . , xn)− f(x1, . . . , xn)
= f(x10b0 + . . .+ x1,m−1bm−1 + b0, . . . , xn)− f(x10b0 + . . .+ x1,m−1bm−1, . . . , xn)
= f((x10 + 1)b0 + . . .+ x1,m−1bm−1, . . . , xn)− f(x10b0 + . . .+ x1,m−1bm−1, . . . , xn)
Hence
∆b0e1f(x1, . . . , xn)
= f(x10 + 1, x11, . . . , xn,m−1)− f(x10, x11, . . . , xn,m−1)
= ∆
e
(mn)
1
f(x10, x11, . . . , xn,m−1)
The inductive step is similar, using the fact that ϕ is an isomorphism and πj are homomorphisms.
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5.4 Cube attack in GF(pm)
The fundamental result of the cube attack can also be generalised to GF(pm). We will formulate it for
differentiation w.r.t. one variable.
Theorem 35. Let f : GF(pm)n → GF(pm) be a polynomial function of degree d1 in x1. Write
f(x1, . . . , xn) =
d1∑
i=0
gi(x2, . . . , xn)x
i
1
Let m1 ≥ 1 and define t = x
m1
1 . Let j1, . . . , jr be all those integers between 0 and d1 such that Sp(jw) ≤ m1.
Then
ft(0, x2, . . . , xn) =
r∑
w=1
cjwgjw(x2, . . . , xn),
where cj1 , . . . , cjr are constants which only depend on h1, . . . , hm1 (and do not depend on x1, . . . , xn) given
by:
cjw =
∑
(i1,...,im1 )∈Cp(jw,jw ,m1)
(
jw
i1, . . . , im1 , 0
)
hi11 · · ·h
im1
m1 (5)
Proof. We apply Theorem 8 and the linearity of the ∆ operator.
Corollary 36. Let f : GF(pm)n → GF(pm) be a polynomial function and d1 = degx1(f). Write f as:
f(x1, . . . , xn) =
d1∑
i=0
gi(x2, . . . , xn)x
i
1.
Let m1 be the digit-sum degree of f in x1. Let j1, . . . , jr be those integers between 0 and d1 for which
Sp(jw) = m1 and gjw 6= 0. Then m1 is the highest number of times that we can differentiate f w.r.t. x1
before it becomes identically zero. Moreover, for t = xm11 we have
ft(x1, x2, . . . , xn) =
r∑
w=1
cjwgjw (x2, . . . , xn),
where cjw are as defined in (5).
Note that in the Corollary above ft can be evaluated at any point, not necessarily at x1 = 0 like in
Theorem 35, because in this case ft does not depend on x1.
Remark 37. A cube attack for a polynomial function f over GF(pm) can be developed based on Theo-
rem 35 (generalised to several variables). However, by using Theorem 34, such an attack can be reduced
to an attack in GF(p) on the polynomial functions f0, . . . , fm−1 simultaneously. In the cube attack we
are looking to differentiate f so that the result is linear in the secret variables. A polynomial function
f is linear iff all the polynomial functions f0, . . . , fm−1 are linear. However, if we mount an attack in
GF(p) on f0, . . . , fm−1 individually (rather than an attack translated from the attack in GF(p
m)) there
are chances that some of the f0, . . . , fm−1 are linear, even if not all of them are linear. This suggests that
for functions f over GF(pm) an attack in GF(p) on each component independently is more promising than
an attack in GF(pm) on the whole function f . Therefore, in Section 4.3 we only described the attack over
GF(p).
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6 Conclusion
We examined higher order differentiation over integers modulo a prime p, as well as over general finite
fields of pm elements, proving a number of results applicable to cryptographic attacks, and in particular
generalising the fundamental theorem on which the cube attack is based.
Using these results we proposed a generalisation of the cube attack to functions over the integers
modulo p; the main difference to the binary case is that we can differentiate several times with respect to
the same variable. Such an attack would be particularly suited to ciphers that use operations modulo p
in their internal structure.
We also show that a further generalisation to general finite fields GF(pm) is possible, but not as
promising as the generalisation to GF(p), due to the fact that differentiation in GF(pm) can be reduced
to differentiation in GF(p).
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